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Job Creation Policies
Can Raise Local Employment
Rates, Especially for
Distressed Communities
Timothy J. Bartik
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Local job creation has
greater benefits when it
increases local employment
rates. Higher employment
rates increase job skills, boost
mental health, and reduce
substance abuse.
n Local employment rates
are affected more by overall
job creation in the local
labor market, typically a
multicounty area, and
not by which county or
neighborhood gets the jobs.
n Local employment rates
increase three times as much
if jobs are targeted at local
labor markets that were
initially more distressed.
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Many places in the United States lack enough
jobs: the share of their working-age population
with jobs—their employment rate—is low.
Tese distressed areas are sometimes small
neighborhoods, sometimes a county, and
sometimes a multicounty area tied together by
commuting that constitutes a local labor market.
Low employment rates impose costs not just
for individuals who lack jobs but for all residents
of these places. For jobless individuals, lack of
employment can lead to loss of job skills, family
stress, and substance abuse. Tese problems spill
over to others in the community, for example by
harming child development, depressing local tax
bases, and increasing crime.
Communities with low employment rates
would beneft from job creation policies. But
what kinds of places should these policies target:
neighborhoods or broader labor markets?
And even if an area is selected for job creation
assistance, what determines the extent to which
this area’s job creation translates into increased
employment rates? Local job creation could
increase the share of the population with jobs, but
it could also increase the local population if new
workers move in. Te social benefts of job creation
are much higher if job creation policies boost local
employment rates more and in-migration less.
In two recent working papers, I argue that job
creation policies should target multicounty areas
that are local labor markets, encompassing most
local commuting fows. Creating jobs in these local
labor market areas can raise employment rates, but
which specifc neighborhood gets the jobs is less
important. Furthermore, the local labor markets

targeted for job creation should be distressed,
with low preexisting employment rates. Efective
job creation policies can raise employment rates
three times as much in more-distressed labor
markets as in less-distressed labor markets. Tis

A job creation program in a
distressed commuting zone has
three times the benefts of a
similar policy in a booming
commuting zone.
contrast occurs because, in more distressed areas,
job creation benefts fow more to existing jobless
residents than to workers migrating in.
For federal and state policymakers the lessons
are twofold:
1) Job creation eforts, such as economic
development incentives and services,
should be targeted at the most distressed
local labor market areas.
2) Although disadvantaged neighborhoods
also deserve help, they are not best helped
by creating jobs in these neighborhoods, as
neighborhoods are not local labor markets.
Rather, policymakers should explore how
these neighborhoods’ residents can be
linked to jobs throughout the local labor
market, for example via job information,
job training, and transportation.

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • JANUARY 2021

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Job Creation Policies Can Raise Local Employment Rates, Especially for Distressed Communities

Employment Rate Efects Key for
Place-Based Policy

everywhere, and do they last into the
future?

Many areas throughout the country
sufer from low employment rates.
Joblessness reduces earnings not only
in the present but also in the future,
because reduced work experience
erodes skills. Low employment rates
also lead to increased substance abuse,
crime, and family dissolution, and they
reduce tax revenues, diminishing the
quality of local public services. Tese
problems persist: low employment
rates today lead to low employment
rates a decade later.
Can local job creation policies
overcome these problems and boost
long-run employment rates? Te
theory is that by jump-starting
employment rates in the short run,
local job creation may increase skills
and reduce social problems, leading
to higher employment rates and
lower social problems in the long run.
But how large are such employment
rate impacts? Are they the same

Local Labor Markets Are Multicounty
Areas, Not Neighborhoods
What is a local labor market?
If we’re targeting jobs at “places”
where employment rates are low, do
we need to target neighborhoods,
counties, or larger multicounty areas
such as metropolitan areas or rural
“commuting zones”?
Much of the immediate efect of
job creation is quite localized. If a job
is created, about 50 percent of the
efect on unemployment exits occurs
within nine miles. A nine-mile radius
encompasses an area less than half
the geographic size of a median U.S.
county. But local job creation has
multiplier and job chain efects that
are geographically broader. Newly
created jobs, for example, can induce
additional upstream and downstream
jobs at local suppliers and retailers,
who may be further away. Geographic

Figure 1 Predicted Job Growth Boosts Long-Term Employment Rates Substantially More in
Commuting Zones (CZs) with Initially Low Employment Rates

5.2

1.4

10th percentile (72%)

90th percentile (81%)

NOTE: The fgure plots the estimated increase in prime-age employment rates over an approximately 15-year period
from a simulated “shock” of 10% higher job growth over the same time period, allowing for interactions between
commuting zones (CZs) and their constituent counties as well as interactions with initial employment rates. The left
bar shows the estimated employment rate increase for a CZ at the 10th percentile of initial prime-age employment
rates (72%), while the right bar shows the estimated employment rate increase for a CZ at the 90th percentile of initial
prime-age employment rates (81%).
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spreading of efects also occurs due
to job vacancy chains: If a new job
is flled by an employed worker nine
miles away, this leads to a job vacancy
at the worker’s old job, which may
be flled by an individual who lives
another nine miles further away, and
so on. Are the overall impacts from
job creation dominated by the more
nearby immediate efects, or by the
more geographically broad efects due
to multipliers and job chains?
In these two papers, I show that
local labor markets are best defned as
multicounty areas, called commuting
zones (or CZs), which are groups of
counties that each encompass most
commuting fows in an area. (CZs
divide the 3,141 U.S. counties into
625 multicounty areas.) I consider
how a county is afected by its own
job creation relative to job creation in
its parent CZ. Specifcally, I estimate
how employment rates in a county are
afected by simulated job growth for
the overall CZ relative to simulated job
growth that redistributes jobs in the CZ
toward the county.1 Tese simulated
job growth measures represent changes
in the demand for a CZ’s or county’s
labor based on how their specifc
industries of employment are growing
nationally. Based on these estimates,
I fnd that a percent shock to jobs at
the CZ level is 3–5 times as important
in afecting a county’s employment
rate as a percent shock to jobs at the
county level. Consequently, the overall
CZ benefts of local job creation result
from CZ-level job growth, not growth
that reallocates jobs within the CZ.

Job Creation Has Much Larger Benefts
in More-Distressed Commuting Zones
I fnd that local job creation
increases employment rates more over
the long run in CZs that initially have
lower employment rates. Figure 1
estimates the sizes of these employment
rate increases for CZs that started out
with diferent prime-age employment
rates (the share of residents aged 25–54
with jobs). Increasing the number of
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Within Commuting Zones,
Job Creation Has Larger Efects in
More-Distressed Subareas
Imagine a distressed CZ that is
equally divided between a highly
distressed county and a less distressed
county. (Te distressed county has
an initial employment rate several
percentage points lower than the
less distressed county.) Based on my
estimates, a policy of uniform job
creation in both counties would have
over two-thirds of its employment
rate benefts in the distressed county

Figure 2 Job Creation Has Stronger Benefts in More-Distressed Counties within a
Commuting Zone
9
8
Relative impact of job creation policy

jobs by 10 percent in a CZ at the 10th
percentile of the initial employment
rate distribution (a starting rate of 72
percent) will increase the long-run local
employment rate by 5.2 percent. In
contrast, for a more prosperous CZ at
the 90th percentile, where an additional
9 percent of the prime-age population
is already employed, a job boost of
10 percent increases the employment
rate by only 1.4 percent. Tis greaterthan-threefold diferential far exceeds
estimates from prior research, which
fnds diferences of 30–70 percent.
Other things equal, a job creation
program in a CZ that is highly
distressed will have a beneft-cost ratio
more than three times as great as a
similar policy in a booming CZ.2
Why does job creation have greater
employment rate efects when the
initial employment rate is lower?
When jobs are created in a local labor
market, the jobs are immediately flled
by three sources: 1) residents who were
already employed, 2) residents who
were not employed, and 3) in-migrants.
But when jobs are flled by alreadyemployed residents, the resulting job
vacancies are flled in the same three
ways. Tese job vacancy chains are
terminated only when the local jobs
created are flled by residents who
were not employed or by in-migrants.
If more nonemployed residents are
available, due to a low employment rate,
then frms will tend to hire more of the
local nonemployed.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

8.1
7.3

Uniform policy

Distressed-county-only policy

7
6

5.1

5

5.5

4
3.0

3

2.8

2
1
0

Effect in more-distressed
county

Effect in less-distressed
county

Average effect

NOTE: The fgure plots estimated employment rate increases of a simulated 10% job creation policy in a
commuting zone at the 10th percentile of the initial prime-age employment rate distribution. Impacts are
allowed to vary by relative distress of counties within the CZ and are shown separately for a uniform job creation
policy across all counties in the CZ (blue) as well as a job creation policy targeting only the more distressed
county (orange). The more distressed county in this example has an employment rate 3.3 percentage points
lower than the CZ average, which is the 10th percentile of county-CZ employment rate diferentials in the data.

(Figure 2). With a 10 percent job
increase in each of the two counties,
for example, the employment rate
would rise by 7.3 percent in the more
distressed county and 3.0 percent in
the less distressed county.
If the job creation policy wholly
targets the more-distressed county
(that is, 20 percent job growth in that
county, and no job growth in the other
county), employment rate benefts
are slightly higher than before in the
more distressed county (8.1 percent
versus 7.3 percent) and slightly less in
the less distressed county (2.8 percent
versus 3.0 percent). Tis county-level
targeting slightly increases average
benefts over the entire CZ: the average
employment rate in the CZ goes up
by 5.5 percent rather than 5.1 percent.
Tus, once job creation policies focus
on distressed CZs, additional benefts
of targeting areas within a CZ are
modest.

Toward More-Efective Place-Based
Jobs Policies
Te attractiveness of local job
creation policies depends on costs as
well as benefts. As argued in Bartik
(2020), policymakers should focus on
local job creation policies that are more
cost-efective. Business tax incentives
tend to be more costly per job created,
whereas services to improve inputs
to business, such as manufacturing
extension services, have lower costs per
job created.
But as my research shows, better
targeting of distressed areas matters
a great deal. Tis targeting matters
most at the local labor market, or
commuting zone, level. Targeting the
most distressed CZs can have over
three times the employment rate
benefts of trying to subsidize job
creation everywhere. State economic
development policies, or any federal
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Job Creation Policies Can Raise
Local Employment Rates

interventions, should strongly
encourage such job creation targeting.
Research should also consider
how to better link the nonemployed,
particularly those in distressed
neighborhoods, with job creation
throughout the local labor market.
Job creation policies might boost
employment rates even further if
residents of distressed neighborhoods
had greater job access, such as
through neighborhood-targeted
programs to improve transportation,
job information, and job training. A
focus on neighborhoods for joblinking makes sense, but focusing on
neighborhoods for job creation makes
less sense, as neighborhoods are not
local labor markets.
Notes
1. Because of measurement problems with
data for smaller counties or CZs, I focus
on a sample of 609 counties that each have
a population of at least 65,000 and are
located in one of 205 CZs of population
200,000 or greater. Tese counties and
CZs respectively cover 79 percent and 88
percent of the U.S. population. I calculate
local employment rates using data from
the 2000 census and several waves of the
American Community Survey, covering
years 2000–2018. I construct simulated
job growth measures using industry
employment data at the county level from
the Upjohn Institute’s WholeData, which is
derived from the Census Bureau’s County
Business Patterns.
2. As shown in the two papers, it is the
percentage efect of job shocks that will
drive the beneft-cost ratio.

Reference

Household Adaptation to Yearly Work Interruptions
By John Coglianese and Brendan M. Price
Many workers experience seasonal
jobless spells. Each winter, for instance,
many construction and agricultural
laborers are laid of as adverse weather
impedes outdoor activity. Similarly,
retail workers are ofen let go afer
Christmas, while school employees are
commonly furloughed during summer
recess. If not ofset elsewhere, earnings
losses from seasonal layofs can lead to
sharp reductions in household income.
But the prevalence of seasonal work
interruptions is ofen obscured in
ofcial statistics, for two reasons. First,
economic data are typically reported on
a seasonally adjusted basis to smooth
out any predictable fuctuations that
occur at the same time each year.
Seasonal adjustment makes it easier to
detect long-term trends or changes in
the business cycle, but it can also lull us
into viewing seasonality as little more
than a statistical nuisance. Second, the
“of-season” occurs at diferent times
for diferent workers, which leads
aggregate statistics to understate the
pervasiveness of seasonality even when
they haven’t been seasonally adjusted.
For example, construction workers
and school bus drivers both undergo
seasonal layofs, but their combined

employment is comparatively stable
throughout the year because one group
is usually working when the other is
not. Tus, aggregation tends to mask
the share of households subject to
seasonal swings in employment and
earnings.
How do households adapt to
seasonal work interruptions? To
answer this question, we frst devise a
new method for identifying seasonal
workers in labor market data. As
detailed below, we take advantage of
the fact that seasonal employment
leaves a tell-tale data signature: a
tendency for certain workers to
experience recurrent job losses spaced
exactly 12 months apart. Building on
that observation, we develop a datadriven procedure for classifying job
separations as seasonal or nonseasonal
in nature.
With this method in hand, we
trace the evolution of both individual
earnings and household incomes as
seasonal workers pass through their
particular of-seasons. In the afermath
of job loss, seasonal separators exhibit
an initial period of rapid earnings
recovery punctuated by a second
drop in earnings one year later. Tese

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS

Bartik, Timothy J. 2020. “Using
Place-Based Jobs Policies to Help
Distressed Communities.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 34(3): 99–127.

n Seasonal work interruptions lead to sharp (if short-lived) reductions in income for
many U.S. households.

This article draws on research from two Upjohn
Institute Working Papers: https://research.upjohn
.org/up_workingpapers/335/ and https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/339/.

n For every $1.00 a household loses due to a seasonal reduction in earnings, its overall income falls by about $0.81.

Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
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Income in the Of-Season

n We identify seasonal workers based on their tendency to undergo repeated job
losses spaced exactly 12 months apart.

n Seasonal losses in earnings are mitigated by unemployment benefits but amplified
by concurrent reductions in spousal earnings.
n Our findings raise important questions about the design of government transfer
programs, which often do not account for the episodic nature of seasonal work.
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Identifying Seasonal
Work Interruptions
How can we identify which
workers are seasonally employed?
One approach would be to simply ask
workers if their jobs are seasonal. In
practice, however, this question is not
typically asked in the main economic
surveys of U.S. households. Another
approach would be to classify certain
industries as seasonal and others as
nonseasonal, based on the typical
employment patterns we see in these
industries. Te problem with this latter
approach is that, even in industries
subject to clear seasonal forces, some
jobs last year-round: for example,
construction employment plummets
in cold northern states each winter
but is fairly stable year-round in warm
southern states. Whether we classify
the construction sector as seasonal or
as nonseasonal, we would inevitably
misclassify many of its workers.
Instead, we adopt a data-driven
approach rooted in the idea that
seasonal workers will tend to
experience recurrent job separations
spaced 12 months apart. To illustrate,
consider a school cafeteria worker who
is laid of in June. If (as is likely) the
worker resumes cafeteria work at the
start of the school year, he or she is
likely to be laid of again the following
June. Similar reasoning applies to ski
instructors laid of in April and (at least

in cold states) to construction workers
laid of in December.
To test this idea, we use anonymized
data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) to track
employment patterns over time for
a representative sample of adults
ages 25 to 54. Using this sample,
Figure 1 plots the probability that a
worker who experiences an initial
separation from employment into
nonemployment goes on to experience
another such separation in each of the
18 months that follow. Te spike in this
probability at 12 months, relative to the
probabilities at neighboring horizons,
indicates that a disproportionate
number of job separations are indeed
spaced exactly 12 months apart.
Confrming our supposition that
annually recurrent job separations are
a signifer of seasonal work, they are
concentrated in highly seasonal sectors
such as agriculture, recreation, and
educational services.
Although annually recurrent
jobless spells are a hallmark of
seasonal employment, they do
not perfectly distinguish seasonal

workers from nonseasonal workers.
Some seasonal workers transition
seamlessly to alternative employment
when their seasonal jobs end, so that
they are never out of work. To avoid
overlooking such individuals, we
classify workers as seasonal on the

Seasonal employment leaves a telltale data signature: certain workers
experience recurrent job losses
spaced exactly 12 months apart.
basis of whether they appear likely
to experience annually recurrent
separations, regardless of whether they
actually do so.
Taking a sample of workers who
experience an initial job separation,
we use machine-learning techniques
to estimate each worker’s excess
propensity to separate again 12
months later as a function of four
inputs: their baseline industry,
occupation, and state of residence, as
well as the calendar month in which
their original job loss occurred. Te
algorithm we use hunts efciently for

Figure 1 The Probability of Job Separation Spikes 12 Months after an Original Separation
12
10
Probability of separation (%)

recurrent earnings losses are echoed in
household income, a broader concept
that encompasses government transfers
and other nonlabor income as well as
the earnings of all household residents.
For each $1.00 a worker loses due to a
seasonal work interruption, household
income falls by $0.81 on average.
Our fndings suggest that
seasonal work interruptions are an
underrecognized source of income
volatility for many households,
especially those at the lower end of the
income distribution, and they raise
important questions about the design
of social safety net programs.
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SOURCE: Survey of Income and Program Participation and authors’ calculations.
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combinations of these four inputs that
are predictive of annually recurrent
job loss. Construction provides a
case in point: consistent with our
intuition, our method classifes newly
jobless construction workers as
seasonal separators if they exited from
employment in a cold state at the onset
of winter, but not otherwise.

Tracking Household Earnings
and Income
Having developed a method
for identifying seasonal work
interruptions, we next analyze the
trajectory of household earnings and
income as workers pass through their
particular of-seasons.
To do so, we build a sample of
seasonal workers who experience at
least one week of joblessness upon the
cessation of a seasonal job. Te blue
series in Figure 2 plots the evolution
of these workers’ average monthly
earnings over the ensuing 18 months,
relative to their preseparation earnings.
Average earnings fall sharply in the

month of the original job loss (and
further still in the subsequent month),
bottoming out roughly 60 percent
below preseparation earnings. In the
months that follow, seasonal workers
experience steady recovery in their
average earnings, as some are rehired
by their previous employers and others
fnd brand-new jobs.
As they approach the anniversary
of their original job losses, however,
many seasonal workers see their
earnings fall a second time. Tese
recurrent earnings losses, which mirror
the recurrent job separations we saw
earlier, refect the fact that seasonal
workers are once again entering their
of-seasons, when they are likely to
face reduced hours or outright layof.
Between the 10th and 13th months
afer the original separation, seasonal
workers’ average earnings fall by an
amount equal to 18.6 percent of their
baseline earnings.
But a given worker’s earnings
are only one component of overall
household income. First, many
households contain additional workers,

Figure 2 Seasonal Workers Experience Yearly Declines in Both Earnings and Income

SOURCE: Survey of Income and Program Participation and authors’ calculations.

6

such as a spouse or unmarried partner
or a child old enough to work. Second,
households also receive transfer
income from unemployment insurance
and other government programs.
Finally, some households receive
other forms of nonlabor income,
such as dividends or income from
rental properties. In theory, seasonal
reductions in earned income could
either be mitigated or exacerbated by
concurrent shifs in income along any
of these other margins.
To see whether households recoup
the earnings lost due to seasonal
work interruptions, the orange series
in Figure 2 shows the evolution of
average household income. To facilitate
apples-to-apples comparisons between
earnings and income, we express
changes in household income as a
percentage of baseline earnings, rather
than baseline income. Tis way of
representing the data makes it easy to
gauge the degree to which seasonal
earnings losses pass through to lower
household income. If the blue and
orange series coincide in every period,
we would conclude that seasonal
earnings losses translate dollar for
dollar into lower income. At the other
extreme, if the orange series were to
equal zero in every period, it would
mean that every dollar in foregone
earnings is being ofset by an increase
in some other component of income.
More generally, the closer the income
series tracks the earnings series, the
greater the rate at which earnings losses
translate into household income losses.
Indeed, changes in seasonal
workers’ household incomes closely
track changes in their own earnings.
During the of-season period from
10 to 13 months afer the original
separation, household income falls
on average by an amount equal to
15.1 percent of baseline earnings.
Comparing the declines in earnings
and income, we fnd that household
income falls by fully $0.81 for each
$1.00 seasonal reduction in earnings.
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The Margins of Household Adaptation
To understand why households
recoup only one-ffh of seasonal
earnings losses, we split household
income into its constituent parts.
Unemployment insurance is the main
source of income recovery: seasonal
workers rely heavily on unemployment
benefts, which ofset roughly onethird of their lower earnings. Other
components of the social safety net
appear to play at most a minor role in
replacing earnings lost due to seasonal
work interruptions.
What about income earned by
other members of the household?
Researchers have ofen found that
spouses of displaced workers tend to
work more to ofset the earnings loss
from a layof. Surprisingly, we fnd
that spousal earnings (or those of an
unmarried partner) decline, on average,
during a seasonal worker’s of-season.
Tus, in contrast to the so-called added
worker efect observed afer mass layof
events—whereby nonworking partners
tend to enter the labor market to
cushion the fall in income—we fnd a
subtracted worker efect.
Tis counterintuitive fnding
suggests that the timing of seasonal
downturns is somewhat correlated
within households. For example, both
partners might work in the tourism
industry in the same location and thus
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be jointly exposed to the same seasonal
cycle. Far from acting as a stabilizing
infuence, then, spousal earnings
contribute to the high rate at which
seasonal earnings losses translate into
lower household income.

Policy Implications
Our research shows how seasonal
fuctuations in labor demand
contribute to volatility in household
income. Now, it may be the case that
households anticipate seasonal work
interruptions and build up sufcient
savings to weather seasonal reductions
in income with little change in
expenditures. But researchers have
consistently found that consumption
patterns closely track the timing of
income receipt, even in cases where
fuctuations in income are very
predictable (as with paycheck receipt
or the timing of transfer payments).
If the same is true for seasonal work
interruptions—as it likely is—then
seasonal forces add volatility to
household consumption as well as to
earnings and income.
With this in mind, the episodic
nature of seasonal work may have
important ramifcations for the design
of the social safety net. First, some
government programs do not readily
accommodate workers who deviate
from full-year employment. For

instance, recently proposed new work
requirements for Medicaid would limit
eligibility to workers who maintain
sufcient employment each month,
which could result in seasonal workers
losing their eligibility during the ofseason. Second, some transfer policies
may not be disbursing benefts during
the portion of the year when seasonal
workers are most in need of assistance.
Tax credits like the EITC are typically
rebated annually in a single lumpsum payment issued in the spring.
Aligning these payments with the times
when seasonal workers are typically
unemployed could help replace lost
income during lean periods and make
it easier for households to maintain
steady levels of consumption. Since
seasonal jobs are largely concentrated
in low-wage industries, such a policy
might have particular benefts for
families on the lower rungs of the
economic ladder.
The views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views or
policies of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System or its staf.
This article draws on research from an Upjohn Institute
Working Paper: https://doi.org/10.17848/wp20-337.
John Coglianese and Brendan M. Price are economists
at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
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• Informed Choices: Gender Gaps in Career Advice, Yana Gallen and Melanie Wasserman
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2021 Early Career Research Awards
Te Institute is pleased to announce that this year it received a record number of applications for its ECRA grants, 84 in all.
Tank you to all who sent in their proposals. Winners will be announced in early to mid-March.
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